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NOTES AND COMMENTS
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS:
A CONFLICT OF LAWS APPROACH
THE necessity of extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws is obvious.
At a time when a national economy may be affected by transactions occurring
anywhere in the world, it becomes a relatively simple task to introduce
restraints upon an economy without entering the affected territory.' The single
fact that an agreement is consumated in London rather than New York,
therefore, should not be sufficient to make an otherwise illegal restraint legal.
At the same time, however, such an analysis cannot be extended to condemn
any commercial transaction in any part of the world solely on the ground
that it might have an effect on the economy of the United States. At some
point, therefore, respect for the sovereignty of other nations imposes a limita-
tion upon the extraterritorial application of antitrust policies.
The problems involved in drawing such a line have become particularly acute
in the post-war world. Critics have charged not only that many prosecutions
involving foreign commerce are not in the national interest,2 but, more im-
portant, that many of the resultant decrees have involved an unwarranted
interference in the internal affairs of other nations.3 It is apparent that the
latter view is shared by several foreign governments. The Ontario legislature
responded to one decision 4 by passing a statute prohibiting compliance with
1. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F2d 416, 442-43 (2d Cir.
1945) (cartel agreement ,vas not signed by Alcoa); United States v. Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 955 (D. Mass. 1950) (cartel agreement did not cover United
States markets) ; United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 887 (D.N.J. 1949)
(same) ; Comment, The Diamond Cartel, 56 YALa L.J. 1404 (1947) (successful avoidance
of prosecution by remaining outside United States territorial limits).
2. Carlston, Foreign Economic Policy and the Antitrust Laws, 40 MiNN. L. REv. 125
(1956) (antitrust prosecutions involving foreign corporations are alienating many of our
allies in the cold war).
3. See the testimony of the American Chamber of Commerce Abroad in Hearings
Before the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4 (Foreign Trade) 1849-1904 (1955) ; Burns, Report on
Foreign Trade Conferences Abroad, 1 A=TRUST BuLL. 303 (1955) ; Linowitz, Antitrilst
Laws: A Damper on American Foreign Trade?, 44 A.B.A.J. 853, 854 (1958). Contra,
Fugate, Damper or Bellowt? Antitrust Laws and Foreign Trade, 45 A.B.A.J. 947, 948-49
(1959) ; Hansen, The Enforcement of the United States Antitrust Laws by the Depart-
ment of Justice to Protect Freedom of United States Foreign Trade, in ABA, SEcTIOx
ON ANTrrRUsT LAw RE'oRT 75, 87 (1957) ; Timberg, Remarks on Extraterritorial Effects
of the United States Antitrust Laws, in id., at 105, 110.
For a general survey of the extent of foreign opposition, see BREWSTER, ANTMRUST
A AwmEcAN BusINEss ABROAD ch. 3 (1958) (hereinafter cited as BREwsT R).
4. In re Canadian Int!l Paper Co, 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
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foreign court orders involving the production of business records,5 while a
later decision involving a Dutch firm 6 resulted in strong diplomatic protests. 7
More recently, an appellate court in Great Britain enjoined the enforcement of
several provisions of an antitrust decree," and commentators on both sides of
the Atlantic have interpreted this decision as establishing the "illegality" of
attempts to apply the antitrust laws extraterritorially.9
For more than half a century, courts have sought to define the limits of
extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws. Initially, a restrictive view
was taken by the Supreme Court in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.'0
In that case, plaintiffs charged that defendant had induced a foreign govern-
ment to assist it in achieving a monopoly and had itself committed violations
of the antitrust laws. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that Ameri-
can courts lacked jurisdiction over either "acts of state" or private transactions
which had occurred within the territory of the foreign nation. Some later cases
involving similar factual situations avoided the restrictive effect of the Banana
conclusion by finding "acts" within United States territory.'1 Where the only
"act" found was a conspiracy,'2 the court's assumption of jurisdiction disre-
garded sub silentio a dictum in the earlier case that such conspiracies, standing
alone, would not confer jurisdiction.'3 Banana, however, is still cited with
5. Business Records Protection Act, 1 ONTARIo REv. STAT. cl. 44 (1950). The Attor-
ney General of Canada has characterized this statute as an attempt to prevent future in-
fringements of Canadian sovereignty. Address by Davie E. Fulton in CCH ANTrRUST
LAW SYmPOSium 39, 47-48 (1959) ; cf. Netherlands Economic Competition Law, 1956, art.
30, cited in BREWSTER 483 n.10.
6. United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 843, 851-52 (D.N.J. 1953)
(Phillips forced to grant immunity from suit for patent infringement on all United States
patents held by it).
7. See Edwards, Regulation of Monopolistic Cartelization, 14 OHEIO ST. L.J. 252, 263
(1953).
8. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. [1953] 1 Ch. 19 (C.A.),
made permanent, [1955] 1 Ch. 37.
9. E.g., Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust
Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954); Kahn-Freund, English Contracts and American Anti-
Trust Law; The Nylon Patent Case, 18 MODERN L. REv. 65 (1955). It has also been stated
that most foreign courts would, under similar circumstances, follow the British example.
Note, 43 GEo. L.J. 661, 669-70 (1955).
10. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
11. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917) (conspiracy put into operation in
United States); United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. and Nay. Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106
(1913) (operations within the United States and control exercised over transportation
facilities located within the United States) ; United States v. Nord Deutscher Lloyd, 223
U.S. 512 (1912) (contract entered into abroad created conditions operative in the United
States) ; United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische-Packet-Fahrt A.G., 200 Fed. 806, 807
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (conspiracy put into effect in the United States). For the view that
jurisdiction is dependent upon a finding of acts, see Haight, supra note 9, 653-54.
12. E.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v.
National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
13. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909).
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approval by the Supreme Court,' 4 indicating that some limitations upon extra-
territorial jurisdiction still exist.
Later cases assuming jurisdiction over extraterritorial transactions indicate
a change in jurisdictional criteria. The antitrust laws prohibit certain types
of restraints when they affect the foreign or domestic commerce of the United
States,' r and decisions and commentators agree that jurisdiction is based upon
the presence of the prohibited effects on commerce. 16 Consequently, courts
have focused upon whether restraints affect United States commerce, and not
whether the transaction happened to include certain events or acts which took
place within the territorial limits of the United States. Thus Banana, in which
the court never considered the effect of the acts complained of, is distinguished
as a case in which no such effects existed. 1T
The effects test, however, is a potentially limitless charter of jurisdiction:
all commercial transactions, no matter where they occur, might reasonably
be said to have some effect on the United States economy. This problem was
explicitly recognized in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,'8 in
which Alcoa was charged with attempting to acquire a monopoly in
the United States. Pursuant to this attempt, foreign manufacturers had
14. E.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 592 n.27 (1953); Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 287 n.3 (1949); Jackson v. S.S. Archimedes, 275 U.S. 463, 467
(1928); New York Cent R.R. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 32 (1925); Sandberg v. Mc-
Donald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918).
15. The major relevant statutes in the application of the antitrust laws to foreign
commerce are the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1958) ; Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-17 (1958) ;
Wilson Tariff Act, 28 Stat. 509 (1894), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1958) ; Webb-Pom-
erene Act (Export Trade Act), 40 Stat. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1958) ; Federal
Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1958). For
the view that § 7 of the Clayton Act applies to extraterritorial situations, see FUGATE,
FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAws 249-51 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
FUGATE]. But see the doubts expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter during oral argument
on the Timken case. 19 U.S.L. WEEK 3293 (1951).
16. E.g., United States v. R. P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Calif. 1957) ;
United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951);
Fugate, Antitrust Law and International Trade, U. ILL. L.F. 387, 394 (1959) ; Hale &
Hale, Monopoly Abroad: The Antitrust Laws and Commerce in Foreign Areas, 31 TExAS
L. Rav. 493, 502 (1953) ; cf. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917) ; Alfred Bell & Co.
v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1951) (antitrust defense to a copy-
right infringement action failed where total output involved was tiny and price-fixing was
explicitly confined to Ireland and Great Britain); United States v. Hamburg-Amerika-
nische-Packet-Fahrt A.G., 200 Fed. 806 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
17. E.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952).
18. Almost any limitation of the supply of goods in Europe, for example, or in South
America, may have repercussions in the United States if there is trade between the
two. Yet when one considers the international complications likely to arise from an
effort in this country to treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe to assume
that Congress certainly did not intend the Act to cover them.
148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
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agreed, through a contract made in Switzerland, to set up a system of export
quotas, and evidence was introduced tending to prove that this agreement
affected potential imports into the United States.19 Alcoa, however, had no
direct connection with this quota system, participating only through the medium
of a Canadian corporation set up to hold Alcoa's properties located outside the
United States.
judge Learned Hand, speaking for the Second Circuit,2 0 held that in such
circumstances proof of effects on commerce alone was insufficient as a basis
for jurisdiction, and that proof of intent to control the foreign commerce of
the United States was required in addition.21 Judge Hand was attempting to
introduce limitations on the effects test; he succeeded only in providing new
bottles for the old wine. Once the government had proved intent, it was held
that the burden on the issue of effect shifted to the defendant. Given the diffi-
culty involved in establishing such a negative proposition, 22 it seems unlikely
that a defendant could discharge this burden. Thus, it would appear that a
finding of intent to restrain the foreign commerce of the United States would
alone be sufficient to justify the assumption of jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations. In fact, however, there was no direct evidence on the question of
intent.23 But the rule had already been established in antitrust cases that per-
sons are presumed to intend the natural consequences of their acts,2 4 and since
the evidence in Alcoa seemed to reveal effects on United States imports,2 5 it
was apparently on this basis that the Second Circuit found the requisite in-
19. Id. at 444-45. See Note, 49 YALE L.J. 1312 (1940) (discussing the evidence sub-
mitted during proceedings at the District Court level). The District Court concluded, how-
ever, that effects were not proved. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp.
97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
20. The Second Circuit in this case was sitting as a court of last appeal pursuant to
a certificate from the Supreme Court. 148 F.2d at 421.
21. Id. at 443-44. This view seems to have been accepted by commentators. See, e.g.,
ATr'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 76 (1955); Barron, Foreign Trade-Mark
Licensing and American Anti-Trust Laws: Some Observations on the Timken Case, 9
CATH. U.L. REv. 25 (1960) ; BREVSTER 297; cf. Note, 71 HARv. L. REv. 564, 566 (1958).
22. Cf. Hanbury, The Burden of Proof, 61 JuRiDcAL REv. 121, 127-29 (1949).
23. See Note, 49 YALE L.J. 1312, 1318 (1940).
24. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 243 (1899).
25. The [district] judge also found that the .1936 agreement did not "materially affect
the ... foreign trade or commerce of the-United States"; apparently because the
imported ingot was greater in 1936 and 1937 than: in earlier years. We cannot accept
'this finding .... It by no means follows from: such an. increase that the agreement
did not'restrict imports; and incidentally it so happens-that in those years such in-
ference as is possible at all, leads to the opposite conclusion.' . .[T]he propor-
tion of imports to domestic ingot was about 15.6 per cent for the first
period and about 12.6 per cent for the second. We do not mean to infer from this
that the quota system of 1936 did in fact restrain imports, as these figures might
suggest; but we do mean that nothing is to be inferred from the gross increase of
imports.
148 F.2d at 444; see FUGATE 144.
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tent.20 In cases decided after Alcoa, pleas of good intent or lack of intent,
even when apparently proved,27 have failed to prevent the assumption of juris-
diction.28
Judge Hand's attempt to limit the effects test, as well as the continued
deference to Banana, reflects judicial reluctance to give extraterritorial effect
to legislation.29 Neither Banana nor the other cases imposing territorial limits
on legislation are, however, based on a lack of jurisdiction in the sense of
physical power over the person. Jurisdiction in this sense no longer presents
insurmountable problems, even when foreign corporations are involved. The
government has lost only one case on this issue,30 and there is reason to believe
that even that case would be decided differently today.3 ' Generally, broad
interpretations of statutory provisions providing for process in antitrust cases 32
allow jurisdiction to be obtained over foreign corporations by means of service
on American subsidiaries or affiliates.3 3 Even when foreign defendants are not
26. For an analysis of Alcoa which characterizes the intent-effect discussion as illogi-
cal, see FUGATE 45.
27. E.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 518, 527 (S.D.N.Y.
1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947) (although National Lead apparently proved that it had
been unaware of the possibility of an antitrust violation, it was convicted together with
DuPont, which had been unable to prove a similar defense).
28. E.g., United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 958 (D.
Mass. 1950) (defense of lack of motive not considered in the opinion) ; United States v.
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 310 (N.D. Ohio 1949), aff'd, 341 U.S. 593
(1951) (good intent no defense) ; United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753,
890-91 (D.N.J. 1949) (although Phillips was proved to have knowledge of the antitrust
laws, the question of intent was not considered in the opinion). Nor was good intent a
defense before Alcoa. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 86 (1917) (good intent no defense);
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912).
29. [W]e are not to read general words, such as those in this Act, without regard to
the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers;
limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by the 'Conflict of Laws.'
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) ; see, e.g.,
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949) ; New York Cent. R.R. v. Chisholm, 268
U.S. 29 (1925); cf. Note, U. ILL. L.F. 307 (1953).
30. De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945). Another at-
tempt to obtain jurisdiction, by means of service upon American affiliates, was also unsuc-
cessful. United States v. De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd., 1948 Trade Cas. 62248
(S.D.N.Y. 1948).
31. In De Beers, the attempt to obtain jurisdiction by means of an injunction was
based, not upon the libeling powers given the government under § .6 of the Sherman -Act,
which had been successfully tested in several pre-World WarII .cases,.see Oseas, Aitti"
trust Prosecutions oJ International Business, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 42- (1944), but upon the
more general § 4 powers. Furthermore, the later District Court decision relied upon a case
which was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court, United States v. Scophony Corp.
of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948), and it seems probable that this later Supreme Court
decision has overruled the De Beers case as well, see FUGATE at 70.
32. Process in antitrust cases can be served on a corporation doing business anywhere
in the United States. 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1958).
33. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948) ; It re Electric
& Musical Indus., Ltd., 155 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); In re Siemans & Halske A.G.,
1960]
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found within the jurisdiction, goods involved in the alleged conspiracy may be
libeled in order to provide a basis on which to bring the action.3 4
Rather, the limitation of jurisdiction involved in both Banana and Alcoa is
based upon principles of the conflict of laws. Thus, Banana, in which the
cause of action was treated as one sounding in tort, was decided on the basis
of the principle that an action in tort is governed by the law of the place where
the act occurred,3 5 an approach which accounts for the Court's emphasis on the
fact that the acts occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.36 Judge Hand's concern with the limitations on jurisdiction embodied
in conflict-of-laws principles is explicitly stated in the Alcoa decision.3 7 His
insistence upon proof of intent must, therefore, be regarded as an attempt to
find an added element which would serve to satisfy those limitations.
3 8
The jurisdictional limitations imposed by conflict-of-laws doctrines must be
distinguished from other jurisdictional criteria. Even in domestic cases, juris-
diction of the person must be supplemented by subject matter jurisdiction-
the transaction before the court must fall within the terms of the applicable
law.39 Once foreign elements are introduced, the court must also decide
whether the transaction is such that the law of the forum-rather than foreign
law-should be applied. It is subject matter jurisdiction in this second sense
which is determined by the application of conflict of laws principles: "the
limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their pow-
ers .... 40
155 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ; United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Infor-
mation Center, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
34. United States v. A.B.C. Canning Co., 4 Fed. Trad. Reg. Serv. ff 4213 (S.D.N.Y.
1931) (Norwegian sardines) (consent decree) ; United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat
Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (French selling agent for German potash);
United States v. Amsterdamische Chinine Fabriek, 4 Fed. Trad. Reg. Serv. ff 4186 (S.D.
N.Y. 1928) (Dutch quinine) (consent decree), cited in BREWSTER 56-57 n.3.
35. The Court in Banana cited Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
213 U.S. at 356; cf. Note, 100 U. PA. L. Rav. 1241 (1952).
36. For the view that extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws violates conflicts
of laws principles in the fields of both tort and contract, see Kahn-Freund, Extratcrritorial
Application of Antitrust Laws, ABA SECTION OF INT'L & Comp. L. RPT. 33 (1957); cf.
George Monro, Ltd. v. American Cyanamid & Chem. Corp., [1944] 1 K.B. 432.
37. See note 29 supra.
38. A close and definite connection must be shown in order to justify criminal prose-
cution of an alien for acts done outside the jurisdiction. 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § 241 (2d rev. ed. 1945).
Intent is one such connection:
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental
effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been
present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power.
Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
39. See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 0.60[2], at 605 (2d ed. 1959).
40. See note 29 snpra; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 42 (1934). The distinc-
tion between the two kinds of subject matter jurisdiction is discussed in GOODRICH, CON-
FLiCT OF LAWS § 67 (1949). See also BREWSTER 74.
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Failure to distinguish between these three forms of jurisdiction has led some
commentators to accept facile solutions to the problem of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Thus the rationale of the leading decision on in personam juris-
diction, that a narrow construction of doing business requirements would serve
to impede the broad enforcement needed to maintain the policy of the antitrust
laws,41 has been taken as dispositive of all jurisdictional problems involved in
extraterritorial antitrust cases.4 2 It is argued, for example, that the wide scope
of the antitrust laws support jurisdiction so long as due process standards
such as notice and sufficient contacts are met.43 But this easy assimilation of
"jurisdictional" precedents fails to recognize that considerations such as ease
of travel, which have led to a gradual expansion of notice and minimum con-
tact doctrines in interstate personal jurisdiction cases,4 4 are not relevant to a
determination of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.45 That some
courts have recognized this is indicated by Alcoa itself, for, in that case, juris-
diction of the person had been established in the District Court,46 and Judge
Hand's discussion of intent related solely to the problem of subject matter
jurisdiction.47 Similarly, in a recent unfair competition case involving a Cana-
dian corporation, the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction before
consideration of the validity of the process. 48
41. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 808, 817 (1948) ; cf.
In re Siemans & Haiske, A.G., 155 F. Supp. 897, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
42. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 3; Timberg, supra note 3, at 105. Contra, Hansard,
United States Antitrust Process Beyond Our Borders: Jurisdiction and Comity, CCH
ANTrrRUST LAW SyMposIum! 44 (1953).
43. Katzenbach, Conflicts On An Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances
in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1151 (1956).
44. See, e.g., Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) ; International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
45. "The 'doing business' which is enough to warrant service of process may fall quite
short of the considerations necessary to bring extraterritorial torts to judgment under our
law." Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 590 (1953) (Jones Act held inapplicable in a case
involving a Danish seaman on Danish vessel in Cuban waters). And see Whitney, Sources
of Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 655, 656
(1954). For a recognition of the problems involved in ascertaining subject matter juris-
diction as a conflict of laws problem, see Timberg, Antitrust and Foreign Trade, 48 Nw.
U.L. REv. 411 (1953) ; Trautman, A Study of the International Environment: The Inter-
national Reach of American Regulatory Legislation Other Than the Sherman Act, appen-
dix to ch. 11 in BREwSTER at 309, 339; cf. Rappeport, Trade-Mark and Unfair Competition
in International Conflict of Laws: An Analysis of the Choice of Law Problem, 20 U.
Prrr. L. Rzv. 1 (1958).
46. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 20 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
47. For the view that the finding of intent was needed to obtain jurisdiction, rather
than in connection with proof of a violation, see FuGATE 143-45.
48. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 133 F. Supp. 522, 526-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
(with leave to amend), aff'd as modified, 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
871 (1956). The Court based its holding on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 133 F.
Supp. 526-29. Since the cause of action was based on the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, how-
ever, id. at 526, it is clear that the court was in fact determining the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction in the conflicts sense.
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Presentation of the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction in terms of con-
flict-of-laws principles, however, does not by itself provide a solution. Tra-
ditional conflict-of-laws doctrines, products of an earlier age, are not adequate
to deal with the complex problems presented by the interdependent economies
of the contemporary world. An attempt to define the boundaries of permissible
extraterritoriality in these terms, therefore, requires a fresh look at conflict-
of-laws doctrines.
THE DECLINE OF THE TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE:
DISINTEGRATION THROUGH DISTINCTION
The Penal-Remedial Distinction
In conflict-of-laws terms, the argument against the extraterritorial applica-
tion of antitrust legislation has been based upon the principle prohibiting ex-
traterritorial enforcement of penal laws.49 An analysis of the present status
of this jurisdictional limitation is therefore necessary to assess the validity of
this argument. The penal law doctrine has often been utilized in domestic cases
to justify refusals to enforce statutes of foreign states which provide remedies
deemed penal by the forum.50 A relaxation of this prohibition, however, was al-
ready evident in the early case of Huntington v. Attrill,51 in which the Supreme
Court held that a statute imposing liability for all corporate debts on corporate
officers who signed falsified certificates was not penal for conflict-of-laws pur-
poses. Similarly, in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,5 2 Judge Cardozo refused to
characterize as penal a Massachusetts wrongful death statute which provided
for remedies in excess of compensation.
The constriction of the concept of "penal" and the consequent erosion of the
prohibition against extraterritorial enforcement of penal laws typified by the
Huntington and Loucks decisions were accomplished on the basis of a distinc-
tion between penal and remedial legislation, which was said by the Supreme
49. It does not matter whether the proceedings in question are in form criminal pro-
ceedings under section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act or some other penal provision of
antitrust law or whether they are proceedings in equity under section 4. In name
these proceedings are 'in equity,' but in fact, and I think most certainly from the
point of view of international law, the injunctive relief under section 4 is a govern-
mental remedy for the enforcement of certain economic policies, or, if you like, of
certain public law duties imposed by antitrust law.
Kahn-Freund, supra note 36, at 37 (citing Banana) ; see, e.g., Haight, supra note 9, at 640;
Kahn-Freund, supra note 9; Meinhardt, Territorial Limits of the United States Anti-Trust
Jurisdiction, 3 Bus. L. Rxv. 187 (1956). But see United States v. National Lead Co., 332
U.S. 319, 338 (.1947) (§ 4 case civil, not criminal) ; cf. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell,
335 U.S. 377, 381 (1948) (violation of statutory regulations of labor contracts treated as
a civil, rather than criminal, matter).
50. E.g., Richardson v. New York Cent. R.R., 98 Mass. 85 (1867) (wrongful death
statute). See generally Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims,
46 H.Av. L. REv. 193 (1932).
51. 146 U.S. 657 (1892) ; accord, Huntington v. Attrill, [1893] A.C. 150 (P.C.).
52. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
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Court to depend upon whether the statute in question punished an offense
against public justice or provided a remedy for injury to private interestsY3
Such a distinction may have been meaningful in terms of the laissez-faire phil-
osophy of an age which could still clearly distinguish a limited area of public
activity from the private sector. But with the continued growth of an industrial
society came an expansion of regulatory legislation and an increasing number
of new types of statutes such as those in the Huntington and Loucks cases.
Such statutes represent declarations of the public interest in private transac-
tions.54 In one sense, they are public, and might therefore be denominated
penal. At the same time, however, the acts they prohibit cannot be character-
ized as crimes against the state; it is private parties who are protected by the
remedies provided.
The antitrust laws are typical. Despite a recent District Court decision
characterizing the Sherman Act as a criminal statute,55 the majority of anti-
trust proceedings are civil in nature.56 Similarly, in the Banana opinion, the
acts complained of are referred to as crimes in one paragraph and torts in
the next.57 Furthermore, the treble damages provision which was involved
in Banana has been treated by the Supreme Court as remedial rather than
penal legislation, 8 and Banana has been characterized as a civil rather than
criminal proceeding. 9 The impossiblity of categorizing regulatory legislation
as either penal or remedial renders the penal-remedial distinction useless as a
standard for determining whether or not a given regulatory law should be
applied extraterritorially.60
53. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673-74 (1892). The British courts take a
similar position. See CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 131-32 (4th ed. 1952).
54. See Katzenbach, supra note 43, at 1087-93.
55. In re Siemans & Halske, A.G., 155 F. Supp. 897, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See also
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 180 F. Supp. 195, 203 (D.N.J. 1959) (decision on
procedure) ("primarily penal").
56. This is primarily due to the overwhelming preponderance of private treble damage
actions. Thus, in 1954, the Government litigated 11 civil and 1 criminal proceeding, while
private parties brought 163 actions. Similarly, in 1957, the Government litigated 5 civil and
7 criminal actions, while private parties commenced 188 suits. Bicks, The Department of
Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 6 n.5, 12 n.32 (1959).
57. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
58. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396-97
(1906). See also Winkler Koch Eng'r Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. .Co., 100 F. Supp. 15
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
The treble damage action is created by 3& Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 US.C. § 15
(1958).
59. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
60. [W]e are dealing with the unenforceability of agreements in restraint of trade on
grounds of public policy; we are not answering the question whether a party guilty
of such restraint is punishable for crime or is liable to an injunction or a judgment
for damages at the suit of a party injured by the restraint. Most of the cases arising
under the Sherman Act, however, involve both kinds of questions at the same time.
6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1382, at 478-79 (1951). See also FUGATE 21.
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The prohibition against extraterritorial application of penal laws, like some
other conflict-of-laws doctrines, is based upon a strict identification of jurisdic-
tion with sovereignty, and a conception of sovereignty as limited to the territory
of the sovereign. According to this concept, a sovereign can exert its power only
against acts which occur within its territorial boundaries. In order to function
effectively, a strict territorial doctrine must presuppose that a given transaction
affects one and only one jurisdiction. The increasingly industrialized economy
to which regulatory legislation is a response, however, is typified by a large
number of transactions affecting interests located in more than one jurisdiction.
Consequently, it becomes increasingly difficult to define rigid rules which will un-
erringly identify the one proper law applicable to a transaction.0 ' The growth
of such an economy has been reflected in the field of conflict of laws by the
development of doctrines modifying older rules based on the territorial principle.
In the field of torts, for example, the principle that the law to be applied is that
of the place where the tortious act was committed has been severely criticized, 2
and there has been a developing tendency to regard the place where the harm
occurred as the place of wrong for purposes of determining which law to
apply. 3 A similar trend away from the territorial principle even with regard
to criminal laws has been seen by some commentators. 4
On the international scene, the breakdown of the territorial principle has
been aided by the existence of shared policies. 65 Thus, in the S.S. Lotus
case, 6 the Permanent Court of International Justice approved Turkey's as-
sumption of jurisdiction in a case involving a crime on the high seas on the
61. See generally Cook, The Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the Conflict of Laws,
31 CoLum. L. REv. 368 (1931) ; JEssuP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW ch. 2 (1956) ; Katzenbach,
supra note 43; Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE
L.J. 736 (1924); 2 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 558-60
(1947).
62. E.g., Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REv. 881 (1951) ; Rhein-
stein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, (pts. 1-2) 19 TUL. L.
Rv. 4, 165 (1944).
63. E.g., Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940); see GOODRICH,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 93; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934); cf. CooK, THE
LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 16 (1942) (similar attack on
conflict doctrines in the field of contracts).
64. See generally Cook, The Application of the Crininal Law of a Country to Acts
Committed By Foreigners Outside the Jurisdiction, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 303 (1934). Cook
justifies this breakdown of the territorial principle in terms of the shift from punishment
to cure in the purpose of criminal law, a shift similar to that from penal to remedial which
has occurred in the characterization of regulatory legislation. Id. at 328-29.
65. See Katzenbach, supra note 43, at 1143-47.
66. Permanent Court of International Justice, ser. A, No. 10 (1927). (French officer
of a French vessel involved in a collision at sea with Turkish vessel convicted by a Turkish
criminal court).
See also Harvard Research in International Law, Comment on Article 3 of Draft Con-




ground that the offense involved was one recognized by all civilized nations.
The extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws, however, cannot be de-
fended on the ground that foreign policies concerning economic restraints are
similar to those of the United States. The United States approach to the
problem of economic restraints is in many ways a unique one. Most foreign
nations prefer regulation to outright prohibition, 67 and in many, in order to
find a restraint on trade illegal, harm to the public must be shown. 68 Such a
standard implies that some restraints may be beneficial, and even nations which
at present regulate restraints do so in terms of an historical tradition in which
cartelization has often received government approval.60 These differences
in policy extend even to matters of procedtire. 0 Reactions to United States
attempts to enforce the production of documents extraterritorially have ranged
from a British court's refusal to enforce letters rogatory on the ground that
the permissible scope of examination in antitrust cases amounted to the allow-
ance of "fishing expeditions," 71 to an Ontario statute making it a crime to
send business records outside Canada in obedience to a foreign court order.7 2
Despite differences in underlying policy, however, the possibilities for evasion
provided by the interdependent nature of national economies require that regu-
latory legislation must to some extent be extraterritorially enforced if it is
to be effective. What is needed, therefore, is a doctrinal framework which can
accommodate the necessary limitations on extraterritorial jurisdiction without
resorting to the absolute jurisdictional prohibitions based on the outmoded
territoriality concept.
Sovereign Immunity: the Governmental-Commercial Distinction
The jurisdictional limitations imposed by the penal law doctrine focus on the
character of the law being applied. Other restraints on extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion arise from the nature of the act or actor being regulated. United States
courts have long refused to entertain actions involving a foreign government.
67. See REGULATION OF ECONOMIC AcTIVriEs IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (TNEC Mono-
graph No. 40, 1941); HEXNER, INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 45-56 (1945); Kronstein &
Leighton, Cartel Control: A Record of Failure, 55 YALE L.J. 297 (1946).
68. See Bennett, Comparison of United States and Foreign Antitrust Laws, 6 U.C.L.
A.L. REv. 560, 561 & n2 (1959) ; Edwards, Regulation of Monopolistic Cartelization, 14
OHIO ST. L.J. 252, 277-78 (1953) (Report by UNESCO committee also adopted this
standard) ; ANTI-TRUST LAws: A COMPARATIVE SYmpOSiUm 522 (3 University of Toronto
School of Law Comparative Law Series, Friedman, ed. 1956) ; Jutckerstorff, International
Antitrust Dilemma, 1 ST. Louis U.L.J. 312 (1951).
69. See generally Timberg, International Combines and National Sovereigns, 95 U.
PA. L. REv. 575, 601-02 (1947). On Great Britain, see Comment, The British Monopolies
Act of 1948: A Contrast with American Policy and Practice, 59 YALE LJ. 899-905 (1950).
70. See generally Gill, Problems of Foreign Discovery, in BREWSTER 474.
71. Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 Q.B. 618, aff'd, [1956] 1 Q.B.
639 (C.A.) (antitrust defense in patent infringement case).
72. See note 5 supra.
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Foreign governments and their property have been held immune from process, 73
and courts have refused to question the legality of acts done by such governments
within their own territory.74 In large part, these doctrines are the result of a
judicial reluctance to interfere with amicable relations between foreign nations
and the United States government, a reluctance also evident in Banana and
Alcoa.
The same factors which have led to an expansion of regulatory legislation
have brought about an increasing involvement of foreign governments in their
national economies.75 The ramifications of this development are well illus-
trated by the world wide litigation which resulted from Soviet decrees nation-
alizing Russian banks and insurance companies. 76 Even without resort to
nationalization, however, many governments are themselves engaged in re-
strictive economic practices.77 Consequently, cases applying the doctrines of
sovereign immunity and "act of state" have become increasingly relevant in
decisions involving extraterritorial applications of the antitrust laws.
One recent case has interpreted the Banana decision as indicating the con-
tinued vitality of the territorial principle in cases involving acts of state.78
But doubt is cast on such an interpretation by the decision in United States v.
Sisal Sales Corp.,79 in which the fact that the condemned monopoly was based
on discriminatory legislation enacted by a foreign government was treated as
irrelevant. Banana also holds that no tort is committed in persuading a foreign
government to do acts illegal under United States laws since the acts of a
foreign sovereign within its own territory are per se legal.8 0 Precisely such
persuasion, however, involving attempts to procure legislation from the Mexi-
can government, was enjoined in a recent antitrust decree which, unlike
73. E.g., Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). See also Deak, The Plea
of Sovereign Immunity and the New York Court of Appeals, 40 COLUm. L. REv. 453, 464
(1940).
74. E.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); Oetjen v. Central Leather
Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) ; Pasos v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 271, 272 (2d Cir.
1956) ; Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E.
24 (1923).
75. For the extent of such involvement, see generally THE PUBLIC CoRPoRATIoN: A
COmPARATIvE SYmPosium (1 University of Toronto School of Law Series, Friedman, ed.
1954).
76. See generally Wohl, The Nationalization of Joint Stock Banking Corporations it
Soviet Russia and its Bearing on Their Legal Status Abroad, (pts. 1-3) 75 U. PA. L. Rzv.
385, 527, 622 (1927) ; Wortley, The Dissolution of Foreign Corporations in Private Inter-
national Law in the Light of the 'Russian Bank Cases,' 14 BRn'. YB. INT'L L. 1 (1933).
77. See Edwards, supra note 68, at 276-77.
78. Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 135 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ; cf. FUGATE
30.
79. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
80. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909). This doctrine
is still applied in situations other than antitrust. E.g., Frazier v. Foreign Bondholders Pro-
tective Council, 283 App. Div. 44, 125 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1953).
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Banana, applied to Mexican as well as United States corporations. 81 These
later cases indicate that the "act of state" doctrine, so confidently expounded in
Banana, can in fact be ignored or overriden in some circumstances; it is by no
means certain today that transactions involving action by a foreign government
will always be immune from antitrust prosecution.
A defense based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity was rejected in
United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft,8 2 where the French
government owned a majority of the defendant corporation's shares. The
court's failure to recognize the immunity plea might indicate a limitation on
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in antitrust cases, since it relied on the
presumption that a government participating in a trading company has volun-
tarily divested itself of its sovereign character. But such use of this presump-
tion is doubtful, for it was established by the Supreme Court in an interstate
rather than international case,83 and there is some question as to the validity
of such a transposition of doctrine from one context to another.84
In a more recent antitrust case, a subpoena directed to the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company was quashed following a plea of sovereign immunity on behalf
of the corporation by the British government.85 The plea was held good on
the ground that a supply of oil was necessary to Britain in view of her position
as a maritime power, and the question of the extent of governmental stock
interests in the company was treated as irrelevant. The court attempted to
distinguish the Kalisyndikat decision on the ground that purely commercial
interests were involved there, while the supply of oil represented a govern-
mental interest for a maritime power such as Britain. 6 Given the complex
needs of modern industry, it is difficult to appreciate the difference between
oil and potash as strategic materials. The attempted distinction is further
blurred by the fact that among the cases enunciating the doctrine of sovereign
immunity on which the court in this case explicitly relied, two involved state
81. United States v. Chemical Specialties Co., 1958 Trad. Cas. 69186 (S.D.N.Y.)
(consent decree). Cf. the position taken in Potash Mined in Germany, 31 Ops. ATr'Y GEN.
545, 552-53 (1910) that any act done within the United States by a syndicate set up pur-
suant to German law would have to be judged in terms of United States antitrust law.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 113 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.
Pa. 1953), aff'd, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 947 (1960) (motion
to dismiss denied) (domestic commerce), noted in 70 YALE L.J. 135, 144-45 (1960).
82. 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
83. Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824).
84. See Whitney, Sources of Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust
Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 655, 662 (1954). Nor should decisions in which an overriding federal
policy was involved, e.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (commercial
enterprise subject to taxation), serve as precedent in cases involving other nations.
85. In re Investigation of World Arrangements With Relation to the Production,
Transportation, Refining and Distribution of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280, 282-91 (D.D.C.
1952).
86. Id. at 291.
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owned railways,87 while in a third, no examination was permitted as to whether
the corporation involved fulfilled commercial or governmental functions.88
Nevertheless, in 1952 the State Department adopted the governmental-com-
mercial distinction as the basis of a policy limiting the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.89
The validity of the governmental-commercial distinction has been severely
criticized, 90 and its application by the judiciary would appear to be difficult in the
light of cases according sovereign immunity to state owned railways 91 and a
Supreme Court 'holding that merchant ships owned by foreign governments ar6
entitled to the same immunity from suit enjoyed by foreign warships. 9 2 In
any case, the new policy announced by the State Department was directed
towards the inequalities involved in granting sovereign immunity to govern-
ment corporations in suits involving tort and contract actions. 93 There is much
to be said for a refusal to distinguish between private and public corporations
when private persons are attempting to enforce causes of action based on
breach of contract or negligence, especially where the plaintiff had no notice
as to the public nature of the corporation involved.9 4 But such reasoning can-
not be applied in determining whether or not foreign public corporations
,should be subject to United States antitrust legislation.
THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE
Government regulation of economic activity, as well as active government
participation in the economy, are expressions of national economic, moral, and
87. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F,2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930)
(railways recognized as a "governmental" function) ; Bradford v. Director Gen. of Rail-
roads of Mexico, 278 S.W. 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
88. United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d 577 (1944).
89. Letter From the State Department to the Attorney General, May 19, 1952, reprinted
in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). See also Bishop, New United States Policy Limit-
ing Sovereign Immunity, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 93 (1953).
90. FRIEDMANN, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY BRAIN 211 (1951).
Professor Friedmann's solution consists of limiting immunity to "minimum" governmental
functions. Friedmann, Some Impacts of Social Organization on International Law, 50 Am.
J. INT'L L. 475, 478-86 (1956).
91. E.g., Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1930); Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. Government of the United States of Mexico, 5 F.2d
659 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 596 (1925).
92. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926). But cf. The Beaton
Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Wash. 1946) (refusal to accord immunity to a vessel owned
by a corporation, the stock in which was wholly owned by the Canadian government).
The Court in Berizzi acted without prior State Department approval of the immunity
claim. The case is apparently overruled on this point by Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30 (1945) (especially the concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, id. at
38).
93. See authorities cited note 89 supra.
94. See generally Wedderburn, Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Public Corporations,
6 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 290 (1957).
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political philosophies. Due to differences in national philosophies, transac-
tions affecting more than one economy may be subject to conflicting regulatory
policies."" Extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws creates such con-
flicts, for the economic policy of the foreign government affected may allow
or even encourage restraints on competition prohibited by United States law.9 7
The problem, therefore, is to define the boundary between respect for the
policies embodied in a foreign state's regulation of its national economy and
the scope which must be accorded to United States regulatory legislation if it
is to be effective. Since some such balancing of interests underlies the entire
body of conflict-of-laws rules, accommodations between clashing governmental
policies might be developed through the application of traditional conflicts
concepts.
Recently, however, some commentators have asserted that any consideration
of foreign interests could only weaken the effective operation of national eco-
nomic policies in a world in which foreign courts refuse to defer to United
States interests. As a device for implementing such refusals, they have advo-
cated a broader application of the conflict-of-laws doctrine of public policy,98
which prevents the maintenance of any foreign cause of action whose enforce-
95. See Balkenstein, The Netherlands Industrial Organization Act of 1950, 106 U. PA.
L. REv. 499 (1958) ; Timberg, Industrial Organization and Regulation in The Netherlands
and United States: Some Comparative Reflections, id. at 525; Wengler, Laws Concerning
Unfair Competition and the Conflict of Laws, 4 Amr. J. Comp. L. 167, 184 (1955).
96. This difficulty is well illustrated by a Supreme Court case which held that foreign
ships violated the Prohibition laws by carrying liquor into United States ports as part of
ship's stores, in spite of the fact that many were required to do so by foreign governments.
Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923). Prior to national Prohibition legislation,
the courts of many "dry" states refused to enforce actions for the recovery of the price of
liquor, even where the transaction had been completely consummated in a state in which
liquor could legally be sold. Note, Conflict of Laws as to Sales of Intoxicating Liquor, 61
L.R.A. 417, 418 (1903). One state court, however, enforced an action for the price of liquor
sold in Mexico despite the 18th amendment, basing its decision on the overriding importance
of trade with Mexico. Veytia v. Alvarez, 30 Ariz. 316, 247 Pac. 117 (1926). Contra, Ayub
v. Automobile Mortgage Co., 252 S.W. 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
97. Many of the pressures placed on American firms abroad are nonstatutory. For
descriptions of such pressures, see, e.g., Becker, The Antitrust Law and Relations with
Foreign Nations, in How To ComPLY WITH THE CLAYTON AcT, CCH ANTITRUST LAw
Symposiu t 51 (1959) (local climate of doing business regarded benevolently if not active-
ly encouraged by the foreign government); Bonsal & Borges, Limitations Abroad on
Enterprise and Property Acquisition, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 720 (1946) (attempts to
force nonparticipants in cartels out of foreign markets) ; Eder, Some Restrictions Abroad
Affecting Corporations, id. at 713 (same) ; Timberg, Foreign Distribution Arrangements
and the Sherman Act, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 80, 84-85 (1955) (foreign governments or firms
may invite American firms to agree on quotas or price-fixing arrangements). American
corporations may also combine abroad where, as in the case of Aramco, the foreign gov-
ernment involved refuses to deal with more than one corporate entity. The Executive has
apparently given its approval to a similar Iranian oil consortium, largely on grounds of
national security. BREWSTER at 400.
98. Kronstein, Crisis of "Conflict of Laws," 37 GEo. L.J. 483 (1949); Nussbaum,
Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027 (1940).
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ment is contrary to the "strong public policy" of the forum."9 The public policy
doctrine was originated in order to justify the application of the territorial law of
the forum to citizens of other nations who, under civil law doctrines based on
status, were deemed to carry their national law with them wherever they went. 1'0
As it developed, however, the doctrine was often used to justify application of a
domestic rule of law in cases where the forum's own choice-of-law rule would
otherwise have dictated the application of foreign law.1 1 The parochialism
inherent in this use of the doctrine resulted in severe criticism by commen-
tators 102 and, on the basis of the full-faith-and-credit clause, the Supreme
Court has restricted its application in the interstate context. 10 3 In the inter-
national sphere, however, totalitarian states have at times practiced an extreme
form of this parochialism by refusing under any circumstances to defer to the
interests of states which had different economic and political philosophies. 0 4
Consequently, a partial return to public policy doctrines based on status has
been urged, and some commentators have seen the beginnings of a trend
towards such a use of public policy by courts applying United States regulatory
legislation extraterritorially 0 5
99. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934). See also GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 273 (3d ed. 1949).
100. See Husserl, Public Policy and Ordre Public, 25 VA. L. REv. 37, 39 n.8 (1938);
cf. Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws,
42 COLum. L. REV. 189, 193 (1942).
101. See Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L.
REv. 969, 980-81 (1956).
102. E.g., Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656
(1918) ; Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 156 (1930). For
the similar position taken by British commentators, see, e.g., WOLFF, PRIVATE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 176 (2d ed. 1950).
103. First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952) (wrongful death
statute) ; Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951) (same).
104. Nazi Germany, for instance, attempted to regulate every aspect of the lives of its
citizens, and consequently regarded all German law as public in nature, and refused com-
pletely to take into account the impact of foreign legal systems. 2 RABEL, THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 560 (1947).
105. 4 CALLIANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 100.2 (2d
ed. 1950) (appeared as Protection Against Unfair Competition in International Trade, in
1 WORLn TRADE L.J. 4, 11 (1946)) ; cf. John W. Davis, Transcript of Pretrial Hearing,
June 30, 1953, p. 35, United States v. Standard Oil Co., C.A. 86-27 (S.D.N.Y.), quoted
in Searls, Trade or Commerce Among the Several States or with Foreign Nations, ABA,
SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW REPORT 58, 71 (1953):
It was held in the Banana case that the Sherman Act, like all other territorial laws,
stopped at the three-mile limit. It is now apparently the contention of the Govern-
ment here that that is not true, that we carry with us abroad, as under the Roman
and the civil law, the laws of citizenship and not the lex soli. We had always sup-
posed that the common law was predicated on the lex soli. No matter whether a
man was Roman, Scythian or barbarian, bond or free, he was judged by the law of
the place where the legislature had spoken. Now apparently it is not going to be
true hereafter of citizens of the United States. They are going to be judged by the
lex of their origin and carry with them their privilege or disadvantage as Romans
or as citizens of the United States.
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Courts have long held that laws essential to governmental functions, such
as taxation 100 or the administration of justice,1'07 are applicable to all nationals
by virtue of their status as citizens, whether or not they are resident within
the national boundaries. 08 Recently, however, the Supreme Court appears to
have expanded this extraterritorial jurisdiction based on status to cases involv-
ing regulatory legislation. One such decision, dealing with the regulation of
labor contracts, may have been influenced by the fact that the territory involved
was an American military base on foreign soil.'0 9 In Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co., 110 however, the acts complained of took place in Mexico, and the Court
stressed Steele's United States citizenship in holding that jurisdiction existed
under United States trademark legislation."- On close analysis, however,
Steele does not represent an application of the status doctrine to problems of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. The case has been interpreted as holding that
United States courts have jurisdiction under the trademark legislation when-
ever American commerce is affected," 2 and this view is supported by the fact
that Banana was distinguished in the opinion on the ground that no effects on
United States commerce were proved in that case." 3 If the operative factor
in the Court's assertion of jurisdiction was an effects test, Steele's United
States citizenship must have been irrelevant; as antitrust cases using the effects
test have demonstrated, that test confers jurisdiction without regard to
nationality.114
Given the interdependent nature of national economies, moreover, any
attempt to return to doctrines of status must end in a welter of conflicting
judgments. The possibility that domestic legislation may be violated by foreign
corporations or by means of transactions centered in other nations necessitates
reliance on the willingness of other states to allow a measure of extraterritorial
enforcement of United States legislation. The need for such comity was ex-
plicitly recognized in the recent case of United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus.,
106. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924) (stressing the "governmental" nature of
the taxing power).
107. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932) (stressing the "govern-
mental" nature of the duty involved) (specific statutory authority for extraterritorial
application).
108. See RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 63 (1934) (nationality as a basis for
extraterritorial jurisdiction) ; cf. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922) (at-
tempt by a United States citizen to defraud a government corporation abroad).
109. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 381 (1948).
110. 344 U.S. 280 (1952) ; cf. Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944) (resident
citizen engaged in fraudulent practices in Latin American markets).
111. 344 U.S. at 282. The legislation involved was the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of
1946, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1958).
112. Note, 41 GEo. LJ. 420 (1953); Note, 21 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 115, 118 (1952)
(noting that such jurisdiction must nevertheless be limited when it comes into conflict with
the laws of other nations).
113. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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Ltd." - The decree in that case required ICI, a British corporation, to divest
itself of certain patents which it had obtained from DuPont. ICI, however,
together with another British firm, had already created a corporation known
as Brtish Nylon Spinners, to which it had granted an exclusive license under
the patents in question. British Nylon Spinners thereupon applied to the
British courts for an injunction restraining ICI from complying with the
United States decree and ordering it to execute the license, and the decree
was granted.11 6
These contradictory judgments have been explained as the result of different
findings of fact," 7 the United States District Court having found that BNS
was created in an attempt to circumvent the proposed decree," 8 while the
British court found that BNS was not a party to the conspiracy."19 The British
court, however, did not rely upon this finding of fact, but based its decision
on the grounds that BNS had not been before the United States court, and
that the territorial principle had been violated by the United States decree,
since the contract for the license was a British contract, made in Britain
between two British corporations.
120
Despite its reliance on the territorial principle, the British Court of Appeal
stressed its desire to maintain comity with the United States judicial system.'12
Similarly, the District Court indicated that its decision conformed with a
British public policy condemning monopolies.12 2  But this view overlooks
significant differences between British and United States antitrust legisla-
tion,'3 and, more important, it fails to recognize that the policy of the British
patent laws is to foster domestic production at the expense of imports, 12 4 and
would thus be opposed to any attempt to subject holders of British patents
to foreign competition. In fact, this British patent policy had been proved
in the United States court.' 25 Rather than embarking upon a dubious attempt
to find conformity between conflicting policies, therefore, the United States
court might have been better advised to recognize explicitly the existence of
conflicting policies, to stress the possibilities for evasion which have threatened
to render United States regulatory legislation ineffective in the absence of
115. 105 F. Supp. 215, 229-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (decree).
116. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1953] 1 Ch. 19
(C.A.), made permanent, [1955] 1 Ch. 37.
117. See FUGATE 92.
118. 105 F. Supp. at 230-31.
119. [1955] 1 Ch. 37, 47.
120. Id. at 51-52.
121. Id. at 53. The United States court also recognized the need for comity. 105 F.
Supp. at 229.
122. Ibid.
123. See Comment, The British Monopolies Act of 1948: A Contrast with American
Policy and Practice, 59 YAIE L.J. 899 (1950).
124. See Bool:ER, THE PROBLEM OF BaRTAIN's OvERsEAs TRADE 171 (1948) ; Note, 66
HARv. L. REv. 924, 926 (1953).
125. 105 F. Supp. at 229-30.
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extraterritorial enforcement, and to indicate the factors which led it to regard
the United States interest as the more important in the particular transaction
involved. Had this been done, the British court would have been faced with
the choice between comity and territoriality, and might therefore have found
it more difficult to persist in its refusal 126 to accept the District Court's finding
as to the attempted evasion of United States legislation. Had the United States
court's finding of fact been accepted, the Court of Appeal's injunction against
compliance with the United States decree could have been justified only on
the basis that the British interest outweighed that of the United States in
the particular case. Faced with the necessity of making such a determination,
it is at least arguable that the Court of Appeal would have decided the case
differently.
Continued adherence by foreign courts to the territorial principle endangers
successful enforcement of United States regulatory legislation where the events
affecting United States commerce occur abroad. Since the United States anti-
trust laws are more stringent and more strictly enforced than those of any
other nation, our interest in a shift from territoriality to comity is greater
than that of any foreign state. Comity, however, is a notion which implies
reciprocity, 127 and it is therefore essential that foreign courts and governments
are made aware that their national interests are receiving proper consideration
in United States adjudications.12 s
Doctrinally, this notion of comity can be implemented in terms of the public
policy doctrine. Although the principal use of this doctrine has been to justify
refusals to entertain foreign causes of action or to consider defenses based
on foreign law, it is sufficiently broad to permit its use as a vehicle for the
consideration of foreign interests.129 Arguments for using the public policy
doctrine in this manner are particularly compelling because of the drastic
consequences of the alternative. Where the court refuses to recognize a defense
based on foreign law or foreign public policy, the doctrine of res adjudicata
prevents a reopening of the question.'3 0 The Supreme Court has recognized
126. [1955] 1 Ch. at 53-54.
127. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws 45 (3d ed. 1846) ("a sort of moral necessity to do
justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return").
128. For the view that such consideration is not at present being given, see Katzenbach,
Conflicts On An Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and In-
ternational Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1149 (1956); cf. Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the
Applicable Law, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 959, 982 (1952).
129. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 382(2) & comment (1934).
130. See generally 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 4017-50 (1959).
When the doctrine is used to deny enforcement to a foreign cause of action, e.g., Union
Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412 (1918) ; Meacham v. Jamestown, Franklin & Clear-
field R.R., 211 N.Y. 346, 105 N.E. 653 (1914), it is still possible for the plaintiff to
find another forum which will reach a different result.
Such negative uses of public policy are often disguised by basing decisions on the dis-
tinction between penal and remedial statutes, see note 50 supra, or between substance and
procedure, the forum's rules governing the latter, Mackay v. Central R.R., 4 Fed. 617 (C.C.
S.D.N.Y. 1876) (wrongful death statute); Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597
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this consideration in interstate cases. 131 It has utilized the full-faith-and-credit
clause-the interstate analogue of comity-severely to limit the power of state
courts to reject foreign defenses when those defenses are rejected on the
ground that they violate the public policy of the forum.132 Indeed, the Court
has extended these limitations to cases in which permanent residents of the
forum are involved.
1 33
Furthermore, in an international context, United States courts have already
made determinations based on a recognition of conflicting policy interests. 134
Thus, in Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft,"35 the New York Court
of Appeals upheld the validity of a defense based on Nazi racial decrees-
edicts which were later characterized as "barbarous" by another state supreme
court.' 36 The New York court based its decision on the fact that the contract
on which the suit was based was made in Germany between a German corpora-
tion and a German national. 37 As this consideration of the lack of contacts
(1936) (refusing to allow a suit by a wife against her husband on a foreign cause of action) ;
Woodward v. Michigan So. & No. Indiana R.R., 10 Ohio St. 121 (1859) (wrongful death
statute).
131. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
132. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389, 399 (1924).
133. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930).
134. These have occurred even in antitrust cases. See, e.g., United States v. General
Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 877 (D.N.J. 1953) (decree) (examination of papers of foreign
defendant more limited in scope), id. at 851-52 (foreign defendant avoids having to grant
immunity from suit on non-United States patents, although the court has the power to en-
force such a condition).
United States v. Holophone Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd per curiam,
352 U.S. 903 (1956) (decree affirmed unanimously except for paragraph ordering defend-
ant to sell in Great Britain in violation of valid English agreement not to compete, which
was affirmed only by equally divided court). It had been argued that this paragraph vio-
lated international law. 25 U.S.L. WEEK 3141 (1956); cf. 19 U.S.L. WEEK 3293 (1951).
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 133 F. Supp. 522, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd
as modified, 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956), discussed at note
48 supra and accompanying text. The Steele decision was distinguished on the grounds that
the defendant in that case was a United States citizen, 133 F. Supp. at 528, and the BNS
decision cited for the difficulties which an assumption of jurisdiction would involve, ibid.
In re Investigation of World Arrangements With Relation to the Production, Trans-
portation, Refining and Distribution of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280, 289, 291 (D.D.C. 1952)
(court received communication from British government).
135. 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938). A result similar to that in the Hoker case
was reached by a federal court in Bernstein.-v. Van Heyghen Freres SA., 163 F.2d 246
(2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). But see the opposite result in Bernstein
v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikanische Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954) (decided after a declaration of United States public policy by the State Depart-
ment).
136. David v. Veitscher Magnesitwerke A.G., 348 Pa. 335, 35 A.2d 346 (1944)
(dictum).
137. See Note, 23 VA. L. REv. 288 (1937). Thus, in a similar situation where the con-
tract was to be performed in the forum by a resident corporation, a British court reached
the opposite conclusion. Frankfurther v. W.L. Exner, Ltd., [1947] 1 Ch. 629.
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with the forum indicates, the validity of a defense based on foreign public
policy should be determined, not by the degree to which such policy is similar
to our own, but by the relative interests of the forum and the foreign govern-
ment in the transaction before the court.138
When the foreign public policy raised as a defense consists of an act by
a foreign sovereign, or the public nature of a foreign corporation, the doctrine
of sovereign immunity becomes relevant. Courts in cases concerned either with
domestic or foreign commerce have recognized official acts by a government
and acts specifically required by foreign law as valid defenses to a charge of
violating the antitrust laws. 3 9 But this degree of recognition is not sufficient.
In the ICI cases, for example, the British patent policies offended by the
United States decree did not require the performance of the acts in question.
Thus, an evaluation of foreign governmental interests which relies exclusively
on specific administrative or legislative intervention will fail to provide
the basis for that degree of comity among nations which is necessary if the
antitrust laws are to be enforced effectively. 140 What is needed, rather, in the
case of a defense based on sovereign immunity, just as in the case of a con-
flict of regulatory legislation, is an appreciation of the relative weight of the
competing governmental interests :141 an appreciation informed by the same
sophisticated regard for political and economic realities which has resulted in
a substitution of an effects test for "acts" as the basis for extraterritorial juris-
diction.
Allowing a defense based on foreign public policy would help to avoid the
confusion created by cases such as Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
138. For an attempt to apply such considerations in conflicts cases generally, see Kat-
zenbach, supra note 128, at 1117-27.
139. In domestic commerce, see Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (California
raisin marketing program upheld). In foreign commerce, see, e.g., United States v. United
Fruit Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 11 68941 (E.D. La.) (consent decree) ; United States v. Ameri-
can Smelting & Ref. Co., 1957 Trade Cas. II 68836 (S.D.N.Y.) (consent decree) ; United
States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 878 (D.N.J. 1953) (decree); FUGATE 50
(stating that only acts required by foreign law constitute a defense).
140. For decrees ordering the performance of acts abroad, see, e.g., United States v.
R. Hoe & Co., 1955 Trade Cas. ff 68215 (S.D.N.Y.) (consent decree) (placing adver-
tisements in foreign journals) ; United States v. Holophone Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.
Ohio 1954), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (must make efforts to sell in foreign
country) ; United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 843, 851-52 (D.N.J. 1953)
(decree) (Phillips forced to grant immunity from suit on its United States patents); United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 228-29, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
(decree) (ICI forced to grant immunity from suit on certain British patents) ; United
States v. United Eng'r & Foundry Co., 1952 Trade Cas. ff 67378 (W.D. Pa. 1952) (consent
decree) (placing advertisements in foreign journals) ; United States v. National Lead Co.,
63 F. Supp. 513, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947) (defendants must grant
immunity from suit on foreign patents to United States exporters).
141. For a test in sovereign immunity cases based on the importance of the policy in-
volved to the foreign government, see Wedderburn, Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Public
Corporations, 6 INT'L & Coup. L.Q. 290 (1957).
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States.1.42 In that case, a United States company, unable to overcome the re-
strictions placed on foreign competition by the British government,'l 3 set up
a British subsidiary, the ownership of which was shared with British interests.
The British firm then set up a wholly owned French subsidiary. The three
firms agreed not to compete with each other in their respective territories, and
on this basis, all three were found guilty of violating the antitrust laws.
Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, evidenced concern over the application of
United States laws to foreign commerce. In articulating this concern, however,
his opinion focused on the apparent anomaly involved in holding market divi-
sions between parent and subsidiary illegal, when the same market division
could have been accomplished legally through the creation of a foreign
branch. 144 Not only is the seeming anomaly unrelated to the majority
opinion,145 but, more important, Jackson's focus on the branch-subsidiary
distinction obscures the basic issue of conflicting public policies which is at the
root of the distinction between domestic and foreign application of the antitrust
laws. Recognition of the fact that it is conflict with the policies of other
governments which gives rise to the limit on extraterritorial jurisdiction is
essential to proper analysis of cases, such as Timken, which involve foreign
elements. Thus if, as is sometimes the case, separate subsidiaries are created,
not in deference to foreign economic policies, but only to minimize taxes and
escape unlimited liability in foreign courts, 146 it is unlikely that different con-
siderations should govern the application of United States antitrust law than
142. 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modified, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
143. See Hale & Hale, Monopoly Abroad: The Antitrust Laws and Commerce in
Foreign Areas, 31 TEXAs L. REv. 493, 527 (1953). Cf. Mr. Justice Jackson's remarks
about the need for domestic participation. 19 U.S.L. WEEK 3293 (1951).
144. 341 U.S. at 606-08. Cf. his colloquy with government counsel, 19 U.S.L. WEEK
3293 (1951).
145. The holding seems thoroughly justified in view of the District Court's finding of
fact that the three corporations were treated throughout as totally separate entities. 83 F.
Supp. at 311. There are several precedents in domestic antitrust cases for a finding of illegal
conspiracy between parent and subsidiary corporations. The Lorain Journal Co. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) ; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948) ; United States v. Yel-
low Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). In any case, and contrary to the view expressed by
some commentators, Hale, Joint Ventures: Collaborative Subsidiaries and the Antitrust
Laws, 42 VA. L. REv. 927 (1956); Comment, Foreign Subsidiaries in Antitrust Law, 4
STAN. L. REv. 559 (1952), the Timken decision was based on the per se illegality of market
division, rather than on a holding that jointly owned manufacturing subsidiaries are per se
illegal. Thus, while other decrees have required United States companies to divest them-
selves of stock interests in foreign subsidiaries, United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus.,
Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (decree); United States v. National Lead
Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 534-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947), a later decision
explicitly recognized that Tiinken did not require a holding that such joint ventures are
per se illegal, United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 557 (S.D.
N.Y. 1951) (opinion), 105 F. Supp. 215, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (decree).
146. See generally Whitney, Foreign Commerce, in ANTITRUsT LAw SYMPOSIU,
N.Y. STATE BAR AsS'N, FOURTH ANN. MEETING 21, 23 (1952).
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in the case of domestic subsidiaries. But where a foreign government requires
local participation, it is probable that an attempt is being made to regulate all
resident corporations in accordance with national economic policies. Further-
more, even in the case of corporate subsidiaries wholly owned by United States
interests, some governments regard the production of business records in
United States antitrust cases as violating their own national interests.147 It
seems necessary, therefore, that courts should examine the extent to which
the given foreign government regards resident corporations, whatever their
nationality, 148 as instruments of national economic policy, and the degree to
which such policy diverges from that embodied in the antitrust laws.
What recognition there has been of the differences involved in applying the
antitrust laws to domestic or to foreign markets has resulted in the demand
for a different substantive standard to be applied in all foreign commerce cases
-a separate and distinct test of "reasonableness.' 49 An early district court case
explicitly relied on the rule of reason approach,15 0 but the decision has been ig-
nored in subsequent cases involving foreign commerce. More recently, a district
court in United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,151 seemed to be recog-
nizing a "reasonableness" defense when it admitted that no agreement resulting
in United States participation in a market which had previously been closed
over a sufficiently long period could be classified as a restraint.152 The defense
147. See Shawcross, English Restrictive Practice Legislation: Extraterritorial Effect
of United States Antitrust Laws, ABA, SEcrIoN OF ANTrrRUST LAW REPORT 111, 115
(1957) (British government reasoned that directors' primary obligation was to a British
company rather than to the United States shareholders).
148. The existence of opportunities for evasion of national regulatory legislation by
means of the fiction of corporate nationality has led some commentators to advocate treat-
ing multinational corporations as international bodies. Baty, The Rights of Ideas-and
of Corporations, 33 HARv. L. REv. 358 (1920) ; NuSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 146-47 (1943) ; Timberg, International Combines and National Sover-
eigns, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 575 (1947) ; Timberg, Corporate Fictions: Logical, Social and
International Implications, 46 CoLum. L. REv. 533, 571-80 (1946) ; cf. Kronstein, Business
Arbitration-Instrunent of Private Government, 54 YALE L.J. 36 (1944). Such treatment,
however, would seem to necessitate regulating such bodies by means of international
agreements, and the existence of divergent national economic policies makes such agree-
ments unlikely.
149. E.g., BREWsTER 354-59; Linowitz, The International Businessman Meets the
Anti-Trust Laws, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1956) ; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation:
Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139, 1175 (1952).
The rule of reason approach was first formulated in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
150. United States v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 Fed. 502, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1915),
appeal dismissed, 257 U.S. 664 (1921) ; cf. Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petro-
leum Corp., 103 F.2d 315, 321 (2d Cir. 1939).
151. 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
152. Id. at 958. But see United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215,
238 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (decree) (suggesting that proof that the relevant markets had pre-
viously been closed might not constitute a defense to a charge of violating the antitrust
laws).
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was rejected on the grounds that a profit, although a lower one, could have
been made by selling United States products directly rather than through local
subsidiaries, and that defendants had failed to prove either a legal ban on
United States products or a situation in which no profit whatsoever was pos-
sible.153 But an indication that no recognition will be given to a "foreign com-
merce rule of reason" is found in an earlier case, in which DuPont's defense
that it had to join a cartel or stay out of foreign markets entirely was met by
the court's assertion that the Attorney General should have been asked to
prosecute the cartel. 54 And although one dissenting opinion in Tim ken urged
adoption of the test, the majority decision was based on a finding of per se
illegality,155 and has been recognized as such in a later case. 156 The Supreme
Court's refusal to apply different substantive standards to violations in do-
mestic and foreign commerce seems justifiable, 1'5 7 especially in view of the
difficulties in distinguishing between foreign and domestic markets. 5 s
Moreover, recognition that the problems created by extraterritorial applica-
tion of the antitrust laws are jurisdictional rather than substantive may facili-
tate their solution. For example, while jurisdiction in Alcoa was probably
based on the effect of market sharing agreements on exports to the United
States, and hence on competition and prices within the United States,5 9 the
153. 92 F. Supp. at 958-60.
154. United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd,
332 U.S. 319 (1947).
155. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951) (citing
the famous per se footnote 59 of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
224 (1940)).
156. United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 387 n.10 (1956).
157. See Katzenbach, supra note 128, at 1152 n.231. For the dangers involved in a "for-
eign market rule of reason," see Justice Frankfurter's tentative attempt to label the acts of
defendant in Banana as "reasonable"! Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 593, 605 (1951) (dissent).
158. See 56 CoNG. REc. 175, 4723 (1917-1918) ; 55 CONG. REc. 3573 (1917) (comments
during the debate on the Webb-Pomerene Act, 40 Stat. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65
(1958), which allowed the formation of United States export association in order to meet
foreign competition in foreign markets). The history of this legislation illustrates the diffi-
culty. See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 453 (1920) (im-
possibility of distinguishing foreign and domestic effects); United States v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 963-64 (D. Mass. 1950) (danger of close cooperation
with the parent companies in domestic markets).
This Act was regarded by many, including the FTC which administered it, as repealing
that portion of antitrust law which applied to foreign trade. See Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Letter to Silver Producers, in EXPORT PRIcES AND ExpoRT CARTELS 125, 126 (TNEC
Monograph No. 6, 1940) ; Sulpher Export Corp., 43 F.T.C. 820 (1947) ; Ex parte Lamar,
274 Fed. 160, 172 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1921) (dictum) ; Montague, The Webb Bill and the Anti-
Trust Laws, 3 A.B.A.J. 145 (1917) ; OPPEN EIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRusT LAWS
66 (1948); Note, 44 ILL. L. RFv. 835, 839 (1950). A recent decision, however, United
States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), has
held that antitrust laws are applicable to Webb-Pomerene associations.
159. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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holding in that case that proof of intent shifts the burden of proving effects
might result in the assumption of jurisdiction in a case where the harm was
not sufficient to justify it.1OO There are cases in which the court has assumed
jurisdiction without examining the question of effects,'(" and in one admin-
istrative decision, a violation was found on the basis of "broad considerations
of policy" in spite of a finding of fact that no restraints existed. 162 Recognition
that foreign governmental interests should be impinged upon only if there is a
sufficient effect on United States commerce would avoid such questionable
determinations.
One possible objection to a solution involving foreign public policy is that
the determinations involved are too complex to be undertaken by the ju-
diciary.163 Courts, however, have often been faced with the problem of trans-
actions which are legal in one state and condemned by another, and they have
tended to employ conflict-of-laws principles in deciding such cases. Thus,
in the cases resulting from Soviet decrees nationalizing banks and insurance
companies, it was held that such decrees governed property located within
Russia,0 4 while foreign branches and subsidiaries of Russian corporations
were not affected. 165 Similarly, contracts made and to be performed in Russia
were held to be abrogated by the decrees 166 even where residents of the forum
were involved, 16 7 while contracts made and to be performed in foreign countries
160. For hypothetical horribles, see Kahn-Freund, Extraterritorial Application of Anti-
trust Laws, ABA, SEcrIoN OF INT'L & ComP. L. REPORT 33, 41 (1957). The position that
United States antitrust policy goes beyond any demonstrable impact on American markets
is taken by Katzenbach, supra note 128, at 1150.
161. In United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 145-46 (1911), the
Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction over British corporations on the basis of existent con-
tractual or stock connections with the American company, in spite of the fact that the
court below had dismissed the complaint as to the British corporations, on the grounds of
their foreign citizenship and the fact that the contracts in question had been entered into
in Great Britain, where they were valid. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 164 Fed.
700, 703 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908) ; cf. United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891
(D.N.J. 1949) (extent of effect not proven).
162. In the Matter of General Milk Co., F.T.C. 1355, 1410-11 (1947) (Webb-Pom-
erene case).
163. See Timberg, Remarks on Extraterritorial Effects of the United States Antitrust
Law, ABA, SEcTION ON ANTITRUsT LAw REPORT 105, 110 (1957).
164. E.g., Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933);
A.M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 532 (C.A.).
165. E.g., Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 286, 20
N.E.2d 758 (1939); Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189
N.E. 456 (1934); Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. The Nat'1 City
Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E. 479 (1930).
166. E.g., Day-Gormley Leather Co. v. National City Bank, 8 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y.
1934) (contract between a United States corporation and the Russian branch of a United
States bank, payable in Russia) ; Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assur. Soe'y of the United
States, 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934) ; Perry v. Equitable Life Assur. Sot'y, 45 T.L.R.
468 (K.B. 1929).
167. See Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws.
49 YALE L.J. 1027, 1039 (1940).
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remained in force.168 Foreign laws dealing with currency regulation have been
similarly treated.' 69 Even the British courts, which tend strictly to adhere
to the territorial principle, 170 have held contracts aimed at evasion of foreign
legislation to be unenforceable.' 7 1 Moreover, there has been some progress in
defining more precisely the factors which would be involved in a balancing
of United States and foreign interests in the antitrust context, 72 and discrim-
inations as fine as those involved in such balancing have already been made
in cases involving extraterritorial application of United States trademark legis-
lation.' a Finally, while the necessary economic determinations are admittedly
168. E.g., Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924).
169. E.g., Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske A.G., 15 F. Supp.
927 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 84 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 585 (1936)
(foreign regulations no defense where bonds were executed and payment to be made in the
forum); Kleinwort Sons & Co. v. Ungarische Baumwolle Industrie A.G., [1939] 2 K.B.
678 (same); De Beeche v. South Am. Stores, Ltd., [1935] A.C. 148 (H.L.) (foreign
regulations good defense where lease payment to be made in foreign state) ; cf. David v.
Veitscher Magnesitwerke A.G., 348 Pa. 335, 35 A.2d 346 (1944) (second holding).
170. See Government of India v. Taylor, 1 All. E.R. 292 (H.L. 1955) (refusal to en-
force political or revenue laws of a Commonwealth nation); Trinidad Shipping & Trading
Co. v. G.R. Alston & Co., A.C. 888 (P.C. 1920) (American law making payment of rebates
illegal no defense in an action on a contract made in Britain by British subjects) ; British
Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1955] 1 Ch. 37, 51-52.
171. E.g., Regazzoni v. KC. Sethia, Ltd., 2 All. E.R. 487 (C.A. 1956) (Indian political
law boycotting South Africa) ; Foster v. Driscoll, [1929] 1 K.B. 470 (attempt to smuggle
liquor into the United States during Prohibition). Both cases are distinguishable from
BNS, the first because no British policy was involved; the second because performance was
to be in the United States.
172. See generally BREWSTER at 446 & ch. 12 (tests designed for administrative offi-
cers). See also Brewster, Extraterritorial Effects of the United States Antitrust Laws:
An Appraisal, ABA, SECTION ON ANTrrRUST LAW REPORT 65, 73 (1957).
173. In the Steele case, for instance, the Court stressed the fact that the Mexican
trademark had already been nullified at the time of the decision, 344 U.S. at 285, 289. In
an earlier decision, George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co., 142 F.2d 536 (2d Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 756 (1944), the Second Circuit refused to grant an injunction
against acts done within the United States where the goods involved were sold in foreign
countries in which defendants had, through successful litigation, established their right to
employ a trademark confusingly similar to plaintiff's. See also Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v.
T. Eaton Co., 133 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd as modified, 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956), discussed at note 48 supra. The Luft case was distin-
guished on the ground that the defendants there had successfully concluded their foreign
litigation in a post-Steele decision, Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co.,
146 F. Supp. 594, 602 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958), in which an injunction was granted against United States
citizens while a Mexican action to have the copyright involved nullified was still pending.
If no foreign trademark, and consequently no foreign interest, exists, a United States court
would have subject matter jurisdiction even where the fraudulent trademarks are aflixed
only in foreign countries. George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co., 142 F.2d 536, 541
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 756 (1944); Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co., 154 Fed.
867 (C.C.D.NJ. 1907), aff'd, 162 Fed. 671 (3d Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 214 U.S. 515 (1909) ;
cf. Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1927) (Alien Property Custodian may
not transfer trademark rights in foreign countries contrary to foreign law) (dictum).
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complex, courts have constantly emphasized their capacity for making equally
complex findings when considering the reasonableness of domestic economic
restraints. 7 4
The burden of establishing the existence of a foreign public policy would
rest, not on the court, but on defendant's counsel. Due to the bulk and com-
plexity of the materials involved even in domestic antitrust cases, firms which
specialize in this practice have developed elaborate trial techniques for the
proof of complex economic facts and concepts.17 Failure of United States
courts, however, explicitly to recognize foreign public policy as a defense in
antitrust cases has created such uncertainty that even these law firms seem
unable adequately to counsel a client contemplating operations abroad;176
indeed, this uncertainty has even been said to limit the expansion of foreign
trade.177 Recognition of the foreign public policy defense would aid in the
elimination of such uncertainty by enabling defendants' lawyers to anticipate
possible prosecution by building a record on a basis known to them in advance,
making possible reliable and more realistic advice. 7 8
Due to the political nature of the conflicts involved, several proposals have
been made advocating nonjudicial solutions to the problem of extraterritorial
application of the antitrust laws. While a solution based on an international
treaty has received wide support, 79 the divergence in present national policies
makes such an agreement unlikely. 180 Furthermore, since the relevant United
States policies are the most stringent, such an agreement, which would neces-
174. This position was taken even in a case decided on per se grounds. United States
v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modified on other
grounds, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
175. See, e.g., the description of the formulation of a defense by Gesell, Legal Problems
Involved in Proving Relevant Markets, 2 ANTRgUST BULL. 463 (1957).
176. E.g., BREWSTER 276-83; Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639, 649 (1954) ; Nitschke, Some Antitrust Prob-
lents in Foreign Trade, 37 Mica. S.BJ. 19 (No. 5, 1958).
177. See the testimony of the American Chamber of Commerce Abroad in Hearings
Before the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4 (Foreign Trade) (1955) ; Linowitz, Antitrust Laws: A
Damper on American Foreign Trade?, 44 A.B.A.J. 853 (1958). Contra, Fugate, Damper
or Bellows? Antitrust Laws and Foreign Trade, 45 A.B.A.J. 947 (1959).
178. But see BREWSTER 307. Compare, however, the author's estimate of uncertainty
under the present system. Id. at 276-83.
179. E.g., Note, Inadequacy of National Regulation of Cartels and Proposed Control
by United Nations, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 626 (1946) ; Hale & Hale, Monopoly Abroad:
The Antitrust Laws and Coninerce in Foreign Areas, 31 TEXAs L. REv. 493, 546-47
(1953) ; Note, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 390, 397-98 (1957). The International Trade Organiza-
tion charter was signed by the representatives of 53 nations in Havana in 1947. The text
is reprinted in 1 WORLD TRADE L.J. 446 (1946), and for a history of the negotiations lead-
ing to the charter, see Bronz, International Trade Organization Charter, 62 Hxv. L. REv.
10S9 (1949).
180. See, e.g., Carlston, Antitrust Policy Abroad, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 713, 723 (1955);
Kopper, The International Regulation of Cartels-Current Proposals, 40 VA. L. Rxv. 1005
(1954).
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sarily be based on a compromise, would very likely result in lowering the
substantive standards applied in foreign commerce cases.
Nor could Congress unilaterally legislate a solution based on foreign public
policy. The statement that foreign public policy is entitled to some con-
sideration in United States courts is, standing alone, almost a self-evident
one. The difficult problems, however, concern the scope and application of
such consideration, and these decisions, which are essentially matters of
degree and involve a multitude of changing factual circumstances, do
not seem capable of being legislated prospectively. Moreover, such leg-
islation would involve a departure from the traditional scheme in which the
judiciary has assumed the responsibility for defining territorial limits on
national legislation.' 8 ' Thus, both Alcoa 182 and Banana 183 represent judicial
glosses on congressional intent.
Another proposed solution would authorize decision of these problems by
the President or an administrative agency. 84 It is of course obvious that in
any determination concerning foreign public policy the courts should, if neces-
sary, obtain all possible aid from the Executive, and courts in sovereign im-
munity cases do rely heavily upon the views expressed by the State Depart-
ment. 8 5 But to create a special administrative solution for extraterritorial
antitrust cases would be to ignore the fact that such cases are only the most
striking illustration of a widespread problem affecting all regulatory legisla-
tion.
The continuing expansion of regulatory legislation and of government par-
ticipation in national economies will require courts explicitly to weigh com-
peting governmental interests in an increasing number of cases involving areas
181. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952) ; cases cited
at note 29 supra.
182. See note 18 .supra.
183. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
184. E.g., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Preliminary Report of the Spe-
cial Committee on Antitrust Laws and Foreign Trade ("National Security and Foreign
Policy in the Application of American Antitrust Laws to Commerce with Foreign
Nations"), in FUGATE 334 (President may grant exemptions from the antitrust laws in
furtherance of national security interests or foreign policy objectives) ; BREWSTER chs. 13-
15. But see Note, Jointly Owned Companies Operating Abroad: A Problem in Antitrust
Policy, 47 GEo. L.J. 125, 130 (1958).
After demonstrating the increasing need for policy determinations by the judiciary, and
recognizing the problems involved as conflict of laws problems, Professor Katzenbach pro-
poses to leave policy determinations in extraterritorial antitrust cases to the Executive.
Katzenbach, supra note 128, at 1151-52. Having led his judicial horses to water, Professor
Katzenbach inexplicably refuses to let them drink.
185. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). Cf. the second Bern-
stein decision at note 135 supra. The Nazi decrees involved in that case, however, repre-
sent an extreme case of conflicting national laws, and the State Department's action is not
representative of its position with regard to divergent national economic policies. See, e.g.,
United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellchaft, 31 F.2d 199, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1929)
(Secretary of State refused to comment despite appeal by French ambassador).
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other than antitrust.8 6 Such a development has already occurred, for instance,
due to the impact which statutes dealing with the taxation of personalty have
had upon the legal concept of domicile, 87 and a similar trend can be observed
in cases dealing with the regulation of contracts.18s In cases involving the
extraterritorial effect of workmen's compensation statutes, the Supreme Court
has stated that "the conflict is to be resolved . . .by appraising the govern-
mental interests of each jurisdiction and turning the scale of decision according
to their weight . ..."189 Consequently, the proper course would appear to
be not to treat the foreign commerce cases as exceptions requiring nonjudicial
solutions, but rather to regard them as providing starting points for the
formulation of jurisdictional doctrines, the applications of which are becoming
increasingly important and widespread.
186. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Minas De Artemisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945) (SEC
order for the production of records by the wholly owned Mexican subsidiary of an Arizona
corporation involving possible violations of Mexican law) ; Note, Enforcing United States
Securities Regulation against Canadians: Conflict of Laws Problems, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1081 (1953). See generally Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on
Rereading Professor Lorenzeu's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947).
187. See In re Estate of Jones, 192 Iowa 78, 182 N.W. 227 (1921) ; Coox, THE LOGICAL
AND LEGAL EASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 194-99 (1942) ; Nash, And Again Multiple
Taxation, 26 GEo. L.J. 288 (1938); Reese, Does Domicil Bear a Single Meaning?, 55
CoLum. L. REv. 589, 592-94 (1955).
188. E.g., Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (direct action
statute) ; Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 150 (1934).
189. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). See
also Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) ; Note,
Workman's Compensation-Limitations of Extraterritorial Effect as to Out of State Em-
ployees, 28 VA. L. REv. 416 (1942).
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